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International Regulatory Responses to
Derivatives Crises: The Role of the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission
by Brooksley Born*
Over the past decade, as derivatives markets - and particularly the
over-the-counter ("OTC") market - have become increasingly global in na-
ture, the U.S.. Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") - the
federal regulatory agency that oversees futures and commodity option trad-
ing' - has played an active role in fostering international regulatory coop-
eration. The technology of the information age, allowing instant
communication and electronic trading, has revolutionized financial markets,
instituting around-the-clock, around-the-globe trading, globally active mar-
ket users and market intermediaries, and an increasing pace of market inno-
vation.
Market crises now have the potential for widespread financial impact
and require international regulatory response. The 1997-1998 Asian finan-
cial crisis that caused equity and currency markets to tremble demonstrated
more vividly than ever before that world markets are inextricably linked
through related products and common market participants. Events that oc-
cur in one market can and frequently do cause global regulatory concerns.
The shocks to the world financial system caused by several recent crises il-
lustrate that this is true for derivatives markets as well as securities and cur-
rency markets.
* Brooksley Born is a partner at the law firm of Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.
From 1996 to 1999, she was Chairperson of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion and a member of the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions.
1 Commodity Exchange Act, Section 2(a)(2)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a)(2)(A).
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The CFTC has taken a leading role in encouraging international coop-
eration to address the issues of systemic risk posed by linked markets and
global market participation and in facilitating worldwide adoption of higher
regulatory standards. This article focuses on these international activities of
the CFTC in the past decade and particularly on its reactions to three inter-
national derivatives crises occurring in the mid-to-late 1990s - the Barings
Plc. failure in 1995, Sumitomo Corporation's manipulation of the copper
markets in 1995 and 1996, and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Man-
agement L.P. in 1998. The article describes the CFTC's response to those
crises and particularly the CFTC's efforts to work with foreign regulators to
fashion international protections against the harmful widespread repercus-
sions that such crises may have. The resulting international actions have
contributed significantly to the effectiveness of regulation of the global de-
rivatives markets and have laid the foundation for higher levels of interna-
tional regulatory cooperation and harmonization in the future.
I. THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKETS
During the past decade, the world derivatives markets have grown ex-
ponentially in size and importance. As stated by Alan Greenspan, the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "By
far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has been the
extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives." 2
The derivatives markets consist of futures and option trading on ex-
changes located in the United States and a number of other countries. They
also include the enormous global OTC market in swaps, forwards, swap-
tions and other derivatives. The Bank for International Settlements has re-
ported that outstanding OTC derivatives contracts, as of June 30, 2000, had
an estimated notional amount of more than $94 trillion, while outstanding
exchange-traded derivatives had an estimated notional amount of $13.9 tril-
lion, for a total worldwide derivatives market exceeding $105 trillion in no-
tional amount.3
Derivatives are financial instruments which are valued based on
changes in price in an underlying commodity, rate or index. Financial de-
rivatives - based on interest rates, currency exchange rates and securities
indices - have grown to dominate the OTC market and represent a substan-
tial portion of the exchange markets as well. Other derivatives are based on
the price of energy products, metals, agricultural products, and other physi-
cal commodities.
2 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Remarks Be-
fore the Futures Industry Association (Mar. 19, 1999), at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs /speeches/1999/19990319.htm.
3 Press Release, Bank of International Settlements, The global OTC derivatives market
continues to grow, Ref. No. 36/2000E (Nov. 13, 2000), at
http://www.bis.org/press/pOOl 1 13.htm.
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Commercial interests around the world use derivatives to hedge against
price risks - that is, they protect themselves from the risk of adverse
changes in interest rates, currency exchange rates, or prices involved in
their business operations by taking an offsetting position in derivatives.
Other traders speculate on price changes, thus adding liquidity to the de-
rivatives markets. While hedging - if done properly - reduces risk in the
financial markets, speculation can increase it.
In addition to providing a method of hedging price risks, derivatives
exchange markets often play an important role in price discovery. Many
commodity futures markets in agricultural products, metals, and energy
products provide price information which forms the basis of pricing in
commercial transactions for those products in the U.S. or worldwide. For
this reason, it is particularly important to insure that pricing on these mar-
kets is not distorted or manipulated.
Derivatives trading has traditionally been regulated on a national level.
However, the markets have now transcended national borders. Exchange
markets in different countries have become linked through formal arrange-
ments, similar products, and common market members and users. More-
over, the OTC market knows no borders and is truly global. It is dominated
by a number of large U.S. and European banks and investment banks which
are the world's major OTC derivatives dealers. They deal with commercial
counterparties throughout the world who seek to hedge their price risk
through OTC derivatives.
In such a global marketplace, no one national regulator has the infor-
mation and regulatory powers needed to insure the integrity of its domestic
markets. Indeed, as described below, three recent crises in the derivatives
markets have posed significant threats to financial stability around the
world. In response to these and similar international crises in the deriva-
tives markets, the CFTC has recognized the inadequacy of domestic regula-
tion to contain the potential worldwide effects of such a disaster. For the
past decade, the CFTC has been leading an urgent effort to design and im-
plement international regulatory mechanisms to address the systemic risks
posed by the derivatives markets. The CFTC's efforts and the strong
international support they have received are described below.
II. THE CFTC'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE
In the newly enacted Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
Congress acknowledges and encourages the significant contributions of the
CFTC to international regulatory cooperation relating to derivatives trading.
Recognizing that "derivatives markets serving United States industry are
increasingly global in scope" and that "events that disrupt financial markets
and economies are often global in scope, require rapid regulatory response,
and coordinated regulatory effort across international jurisdictions," Con-
gress expressed its view that the CFTC should "continue to coordinate with
foreign regulatory authorities, to participate in international regulatory or-
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ganizations and forums, and to provide technical assistance to foreign gov-
ernment authorities."4
In enacting this provision, Congress paid tribute to the efforts of the
CFTC to address the globalization of the derivatives markets and their at-
tendant worldwide risks through increased international cooperation, infor-
mation sharing, and regulatory harmonization. Those efforts have
continued for more than a decade and have included the CFTC's negotia-
tion of memoranda of understanding ("MOUs") providing for sharing of in-
formation with foreign derivatives regulators, the CFTC's membership in
organizations of international regulators and its provision of technical assis-
tance to foreign regulatory authorities.
A. Memoranda of Understanding
The CFTC has entered into a large number of information-sharing
MOUs with foreign regulators.5 These MOUs are designed to facilitate en-
forcement efforts in cases with cross-border aspects and to enhance over-
sight of markets, intermediaries and market participants.
Since 1988 the CFTC has taken the position that in general such
MOUs are prerequisites to CFTC exemptions granted to foreign futures
professionals offering to sell futures and options traded on a foreign board
of trade to U.S. customers. Foreign futures brokers may sell foreign futures
and commodity options to U.S. customers without registering with the
CFTC and the National Futures Association ("NFA") 6 as futures commis-
sion merchants ("FCMs") under U.S. law as long as they qualify for an ex-
emption from the CFTC's Part 30 rules.7 One of the criteria for such an
exemption is that the regulator in the foreign future brokers' home country
and/or the foreign market of which the foreign futures brokers are members
4 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Section 126, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 126, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). This new legislation significantly revises many aspects of the
federal commodities laws as well as certain federal securities, banking and bankruptcy laws.
The legislation excludes or exempts from the federal commodities laws certain categories of
derivatives transactions, including many OTC derivatives, modernizes the regulatory regime
for futures exchanges, authorizes for the first time trading in single-stock futures, and estab-
lishes a regulatory regime for derivatives clearing operations, among other things.
5 See generally, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, The CFTC: An Active Partner
in Global Cooperation Through Information Sharing With Other Financial Regulators,
CFTC Backgrounder, No. 4-92 (Apr. 28, 1999), at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/backgrounder/opamou.htm, for a description of many of the
CFTC's MOUs.
6 The NFA is a registered futures association under Commodity Exchange Act Sec-
tion 17, 7 U.S.C. § 21. The CFTC has delegated to the NFA the responsibility to register
commodity professionals, to determine their fitness and to set rules regulating sales practices
and protection of customers. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53445 n.3 (Oct. 29, 1981).
7 See 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 (2000).
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have entered into a satisfactory MOU with the CFTC.8 These information-
sharing arrangements provide the CFTC with access to information neces-
sary "to monitor domestic markets and to protect U.S. customers trading on
foreign markets."9 Information relating to foreign futures professionals, in-
cluding their fitness, qualification to do business, capital, and disciplinary
history may be sought, as may information concerning transactions they
execute on behalf of U.S. customers.10
CFTC MOUs are also used to obtain information needed for purposes
other than implementing exemptions to the Part 30 rules. For example, co-
operative enforcement MOUs are designed to allow the exchange of infor-
mation relevant to enforcement of futures and derivatives laws. Financial
information sharing MOUs ("FISMOUs") were initially designed to pro-
vide sufficient information to allow the host country of a foreign company
to apply the capital requirements of its home country. More recently, they
have facilitated regulatory risk assessment of related firms conducting busi-
ness in different countries." Of course, the CFTC and foreign derivatives
regulators frequently share information on an informal basis even when no
MOU is in place.
Most CFTC MOUs have been entered into between the CFTC and a
derivatives regulator and/or a self-regulatory authority in a second country.
However, the CFTC along with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") has also entered into MOUs with United Kingdom authorities
that relate to securities and banking issues as well as derivatives. As the
evolution of financial markets blurs the separation of derivatives, securities
and currency markets and their participants, it is likely that more emphasis
will be placed on such cross-sectoral arrangements and that the CFTC will
negotiate additional cross-sectoral arrangements.
Furthermore, as described in more detail below, the CFTC has been in-
strumental in the creation, adoption and implementation of a significant
' 17 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix A, Interpretive Statement With Respect to the Commis-
sion's Exemptive Authority Under § 30.10 of Its Rules (2000).
9Id.
10 Id. Exemption from the Part 30 rules under 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 had been granted to fu-
tures professionals in eight countries as of May 31, 2000, pursuant to such MOUs with regu-
latory and self-regulatory authorities: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand,
Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Authorities That Have Received Exemptions Under CFTC
Rule 30.10, CFTC Backgrounder, No. 12-99 (May 31, 2000), at
http://vww.cftc.gov/opafbackgrounder/P30BKO1A.htm.
" As of April 28, 1999, the CFTC had entered into cooperative enforcement MOUs with
authorities in seventeen countries and FISMOUs with authorities in Canada and the United
Kingdom. In addition, an arrangement with authorities in Hong Kong facilitates cooperation
in supervising cross-border managed futures activity. See Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, supra note 5.
2 See id.
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multilateral information sharing arrangement, the Declaration on Coopera-
tion and Supervision of International Futures Markets and Clearing Organi-
sations entered into in March 1996 in Boca Raton, Florida ("Boca
Declaration") - the first such multilateral arrangement regarding derivatives
markets.13 The Boca Declaration is designed to facilitate international regu-
latory information sharing concerning events that may have broad-based in-
ternational financial repercussions, including significant financial problems
of exchange or clearinghouse members or their customers - such as oc-
curred to Barings Plc. - or potential market manipulation - such as that by
Sumitomo Corporation.
The CFTC's bilateral and multilateral MOUs are the vehicle for nu-
merous exchanges of information. For example, during fiscal year 1996,
the CFTC requested information from foreign regulators on 190 occasions
and received requests from foreign regulators on 65 occasions.14  The
MOUs are invaluable in assisting derivatives regulators to obtain the infor-
mation and cooperation needed to oversee a global marketplace and to de-
tect events that may pose significant economic dangers.
B. International Organizations
In recent years international organizations have played an increasingly
important role in promoting international cooperation through information
sharing and regulatory harmonization. For derivatives and securities regu-
lators, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO") has emerged as the leading worldwide international organiza-
tion. Currently headquartered in Madrid, Spain, IOSCO, consists of securi-
ties and derivatives commissions and exchanges from around the world. As
of May 2000, it had a membership of 165 entities.15 The SEC is an ordi-
nary member of IOSCO and the CFTC is an associate member.
1 6
The CFTC has used its role as a member of IOSCO's Technical Com-
mittee to foster improved regulatory oversight over derivatives markets and
harmonization of standards for derivatives regulation worldwide. For ex-
ample, the CFTC staff has worked within IOSCO to develop and update a
13 Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of International Futures Markets and
Clearing Organizations, executed on March 15, 1996, in Boca Raton, Florida,
http:/www.cftc.gov/oialbocadec0398.htm; Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Press Release 3995-96 (Mar. 15, 1996), at
http:www.cftc.gov/opalpress96/declare.htm.
" See Brooksley Born, Chairperson, CFTC, Address before the Section of Business Law
Committee on Regulation of Futures and Derivative Investments and the Derivative Instru-
ments Subcommittee of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar
Association (Aug. 4, 1997), at http:llwww.cftc.gov/opalspeeches/opabom-19.htm.
15 See International Organization of Securities Commissions, Final Communiqdie of the
25th Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (May
2000), at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opabom-19.htm.
16 See IOSCO Membership Lists, available at http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html.
The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
21:607 (2001)
publication entitled International Regulation of Derivative Markets, Prod-
ucts and Financial Intermediaries (December 1996), which describes vari-
ous approaches to derivatives market regulation.
17
Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of IOSCO has been its
adoption of the report on Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
(September 1998)."' With the CFTC's assistance, this report incorporates
objectives and principles of derivatives regulation as well as securities regu-
lation. It constitutes a significant international consensus on the principles
necessary to protect market participants, to ensure that markets are fair, ef-
ficient and transparent, and to reduce systemic risk. IOSCO is actively
working on implementation of these principles.
The CFTC has also served on IOSCO's Internet Task Force and con-
tributed significantly to its Technical Committee's 1998 report on Securities
Activity on the Internet (September 1998), which includes principles to be
considered when adopting regulatory policies involving Internet activities.1 9
The CFTC also participated in an IOSCO-sponsored Internet Surf Day on
March 28, 2000, aimed at detecting securities and futures fraud on the
Internet.2"
In addition to IOSCO, there are regional organizations of securities and
derivatives regulators such as the Forum of European Securities Commis-
sions ("FESCO")21 and the Council of Securities Regulators of the Ameri-
cas ("COSRA"). 22 The CFTC is an active member of COSRA. It also
participates in the activities of the Quadrilateral Group, a cross-sectoral ef-
fort that consists of U.S. and U.K. banking supervisors and securities and
17 See IOSCO, Report on the International Regulation of Derivative Markets, Products
and Financial Intermediaries (1997), available at http://www.iosco.org/docs-
publicdownload_1996 regulationofderivativemarkets.html; Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Annual Report 64, http:llwWW.cftc.gov/annualreport97/chair97.htm; Press Re-
lease, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Announces Availability of the Inter-
national Regulation of Derivative Markets, Products and Financial Intermediaries and 1997
Status Report on Exchange-Traded Derivatives Markets in Emerging and Developing Coun-
tries, Press Release 4054-97 (Sept. 19, 1997), available at
http://vww.cftc.gov/opa/press97/4054-97.htm.
18 See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Sept. 1998), at
http://vww.iosco.org /docs-public/1998-objectives.html; Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission, Annual Report 97 (1998), available at
http://ww.cftc.gov/annualreport98/chair98.htm.
9 See IOSCO, Securities Activity on the Internet (Sept. 1998), available at
http://www.iosco.org/docs-publicf1998-internetsecurity.html.
2 0 See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Participates in In-
ternational "Internet Surf' Day to Uncover Fraudulent Promotion of Commodity Schemes,
Press Release 4399-00 (May 15, 2000), at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enfOO/4399-OO.htn.
21 See, e.g., http:l/vww.europefesco.orglvl/defaultasp (website of FESCO).
22 COSRA, founded in 1992, is an organization of market regulators from 26 nations in
the Western Hemisphere and is dedicated to the promotion of market integrity. See
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/Cosralinter.asp (website of COSRA).
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derivatives regulators.' Furthermore, the CFTC hosts a day-long meeting
of international derivatives regulators once a year in March in Boca Raton,
Florida at the Annual Meeting of the Futures Industry Association ("FIA"),
a trade association of futures professionals.24
These international organizations provide forums in which interna-
tional regulators may form a consensus about appropriate regulatory goals
and standards and about international cooperation for regulating global
markets. They have played a significant role in enhancing the level and
quality of international regulation in derivatives markets. They also bring
regulators from all over the world together and foster personal relationships
which facilitate cooperation and communication during emergencies.
C. Technical Assistance
In addition to its efforts to negotiate MOUs and its activities through
international organizations such as IOSCO and COSRA, the CFTC has pro-
vided'extensive technical assistance to derivatives regulators in other coun-
tries. Since 1990 the CFTC has annually sponsored a training seminar for
international market authorities.25 In recent years, the seminar has been a
week-long program held in Chicago, Illinois, for staff members of foreign
regulators and markets. It focuses on standards and techniques of effective
oversight of derivatives markets to preserve market integrity and to promote
customer protection. CFTC senior staff, Chicago exchange authorities, rep-
resentatives of the NFA and the FIA, and other recognized experts in the
derivatives field participate as teachers in the training effort. During the
past decade, hundreds of staff members of foreign regulators and foreign
markets have received this intensive tutoring in how to regulate their de-
rivatives markets effectively and at the same time have had the opportunity
to meet and get to know their counterparts from around the world. The
CFTC training seminars have made a significant contribution in fostering
international regulatory cooperation relating to derivatives and raising the
level of derivatives regulation worldwide.
These training seminars have been supplemented by CFTC technical
assistance to individual foreign regulatory authorities, ranging from training
sessions designed for the staff of a foreign regulator to extended visits by a
member of the staff of a foreign regulator with the CFTC to observe its op-
23 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Annual Report 63 (1997), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/annualreport97/chair97.htm.
24 See, e.g., Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, International Fu-
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erations. Informational materials and consultation are regularly provided by
the CFTC staff to foreign regulatory authorities.
In addition, the CFTC staff undertakes to study and report on many is-
sues relevant to international derivatives regulation. For example, in 1999
alone the CFTC published a study on Regulation of OTC Derivatives
Transactions26 based on the regulatory regimes of sixteen countries, a re-
port entitled Exchange-Traded Derivatives in Developing Capital Markets
Repor ? 7 based on a survey of jurisdictions with developing capital markets,
and a survey on Futures Exchange and Contract Authorization Standards
and Procedures in Selected Countries (August 1999).28 These surveys and
reports have contributed greatly to international understanding of the exist-
ing variations in derivatives regulation, international consensus on best
practices for derivatives regulation, and international enhancement of the
quality of derivatives regulation.
D. Office of International Affairs and Global Markets Advisory Committee
In recognition of the growing importance of its international activities,
the CFTC created an Office of International Affairs in July 1997 to central-
ize and facilitate such activities.2 9 As stated in the CFTC's 1997 Annual
Report, "The Office of International Affairs will enhance the Commission's
ability to meet the challenges posed by globalization of financial markets in
three important ways: (1) to respond quickly to market crises that have
global systemic implications; (2) to remain an effective supervisor in a
global marketplace where no one regulator has all the information or re-
sources to regulate its markets or its firms; and (3) to eliminate unnecessary
impediments to global business while preserving core protections for mar-
kets and customers. 30
26 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Regulation of Over-The-Counter De-
rivatives (March 1999), available at http:/www.cftc.gov/filesloialoiaotcs99a.pdf and
http://www.cftc.gov/files/oialoiaotcs99b.pdf.
27 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Exchange-Traded Derivatives in Devel-
oping Capital Markets Report (1999), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/oial
oiadcmrprtl.pdf.28 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Futures Exchange and Contract Au-
thorization Standards and Procedures in Selected Countries (1999), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/files/oialoiamarketcontracts.pdf..
29 See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Establishes Office of
International Affairs, Press Release 4034-47 (July 8, 1997), available at
http:llvww.cftc.gov/opalpress97/4034-97.htm. The Director of the Office of International
Affairs, Andrea Corcoran, had been for many years Director of the CFTC's Division of
Trading and Markets. In both roles she has been a leader in the CFTC's international activi-
ties and largely responsible for their success.
30Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Annual Report 9 (1997), available at
http:llcftc.gov/anr/anrcontents97.htm.
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The CFTC also believes that it is appropriate to reach out to derivatives
industry participants for views and guidance on the CFTC's international
activities. For this reason, the CFTC created a Global Markets Advisory
Committee in February 1998, consisting of representatives of U.S. deriva-
tives markets, intermediaries and market participants. 31 As I stated in wel-
coming the members of the Advisory Committee to its first meeting on May
14, 1998:
Our exchanges deserve a level playing field in which foreign markets
are subject to effective regulation. Market participants should also be
free to use markets around the world with the assurance that these
markets are safe and sound and without the burdens of unnecessary
regulatory complexity and diversity. Differences in regulatory ap-
proaches will undoubtedly continue, reflecting different cultures and
legal systems. However, it is incumbent on regulators to work toward
harmonization so that regulation does not unnecessarily impede in-
vestment decisions and economic innovation. The information and
suggestions provided by this Committee will assist the Commission in
evaluating our activities to achieve those goals.
The Advisory Committee has provided a forum for interested members
of the industry to alert the CFTC to areas in which international divergence
in regulatory standards creates barriers to participation in the global markets
and to areas in which a lack of international regulatory cooperation poses
unnecessary dangers to financial stability.
It is within this context of a network of MOUs, membership in interna-
tional organizations, and active provision of technical assistance to foreign
regulators that the CFTC responded to three international derivatives crises
in the mid-to-late 1990s. The resulting framework of interrelationships
with foreign regulators that had been established by the CFTC assisted
greatly in its international activities in response to these crises, as is de-
scribed below.
I. THE BARINGS BANK FAILURE
The failure of Barings Plc. ("Barings") is a prime example of the broad
scope of international activities of many derivatives market participants and
the potential international repercussions from their missteps. Barings, a
large, old, and established British merchant bank, had worldwide affiliates
and operations and traded on numerous world futures markets, including
those in Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. Barings
suffered financial collapse in February and March 1995 because of the al-
31 See 63 Fed. Reg. 10595 (Mar. 4, 1998); Commodity Futures Trading Commission An-
nual Report 13 (1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/annualreport98/YIR98.htm.
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legedly unauthorized derivatives trading activities of a young employee of a
Barings affiliate in Singapore on Singapore and Japanese futures markets
that resulted in losses exceeding a billion dollars. Significant international
economic repercussions from the incident were averted only because ING, a
Dutch bank, stepped in to take over Barings. 2
A. Efforts to Contain the U.S. Impact
In response to the failure of Barings, 33 the CFTC immediately evalu-
ated the potential impact of the failure for U.S. markets and U.S. firms.
Thus, the CFTC promptly investigated the extent of any direct participation
or trading, activity by Barings or its affiliates in the U.S. futures markets. It
also investigated whether U.S. FCMs had business relationships with Bar-
ings - for example, whether they were clearing or executing trades through
Barings or its affiliates on foreign markets. These investigations did not re-
veal any significant concerns.
Nonetheless, a number of U.S. FCMs had subsidiaries that cleared
through the Singapore and Japanese derivatives exchanges involved in the
Barings trading and there was a need to protect the U.S. firms and their af-
filiates from significant losses on those foreign exchanges. The CFTC staff
spent a great deal of time and effort in negotiating with the foreign ex-
changes and their regulators to protect margin funds deposited by U.S.
firms with those foreign exchanges and to prevent their being used to reim-
burse Barings' losses. The CFTC staff also worked to facilitate the transfer
32 See, e.g., Marcus W. Brauchli, Many Who Knew Barings PLC Suggest Firm Wasn't
Model Corporate Citizen, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A16; Peter Martin, Death Came
Sudden and Swift for Barings, THE FIN. PosT, Mar. 4, 1995, at 6; Marcus W. Brauchli and
Jeremy Mark, Barings, Unlikely to Tarnish Singapore Marketsfor Long, WALL ST. J., Mar.
1, 1995, at Cl.
33 For detailed descriptions of the CFTC's response to the Barings crisis, see Brooksley
Born, Chairperson, CFTC, Address before the Section of Business Law Committee on Regu-
lation of Futures and Derivative Investments and the Derivative Instruments Subcommittee
of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association (Aug. 4,
1997), at http://cftc.gov/opalspeechesfbom-19.htm; Testimony of John E. Tull, Jr., Acting
Chairman, CFTC, before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Agri-
culture, Rural Development, FDA, and Related Agencies, (Mar. 14, 1996), available at
http://wwv.cftc.gov/opa/speechesltestimon.html; Joseph B. Dial, Commissioner, CFTC,
Address before IDBISDA Latin America Derivatives Conference (Nov. 10, 1995), at
http://vww.cftc.gov/opa/speecheslidbsingl.html; Joseph B. Dial, Commissioner of theCFTC,
Address at 18'h Annual Commodities Law Institute and the 4t ' Annual Financial Services
Law Institute Conference (Oct. 19, 1995), at
http:llvwwv.cftc.gov/opa/speechees/chic955.html; Mary L. Schairo, Chairman, CFTC, Ad-
dress at the 18th Annual Commodities Law Institute and the 4 Annual Financial Services
Law Institute Conference (Oct. 19, 1995), at http://www.cftc.gov/opalspeeches/ kent2.html;
Suzanne McGee, CFTC's New Chairman Carves Success Story From Barings Crisis, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at 17; John M. Berry and Clay Chandler, Bank Failure Set Off
Race To Cut Harm; U.S., Other Officials Acted in Barings Case, WASH. PoST, Mar. 1, 1995,
at Cl.
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of derivatives positions held by U.S. customers or U.S. firms at the foreign
exchanges. Finally, the CFTC was alert to the potential impact on U.S. ex-
changes and their member firms from heightened volatility in domestic
markets relating to the Barings crisis.
B. The Windsor Declaration
The experience of the CFTC and foreign derivatives regulators during
the Barings collapse highlighted the need to put in place methods of coping
with the extraterritorial impact of such crises in the future. The Barings in-
cident showed that the default of a major financial institution because of
speculation in the derivatives markets clearly could pose undue risks to the
world's financial fabric. The CFTC believed that improved communication
among regulators and exchanges globally, international understandings to
limit and contain risk relating to such defaults, and the ability to clear,
transfer, and protect the positions of other market participants during such a
crisis were critically important.
The first step by the CFTC to address these problems internationally
was to co-sponsor a conference held in Windsor, England, in May 1995
with the United Kingdom's Securities and Investment Board ("SIB"), the
agency then overseeing securities and derivatives markets in the U.K.
Regulatory authorities from sixteen countries with major futures and option
markets attended the meeting and addressed the international regulatory is-
sues posed by the Barings collapse and similar large defaults. 3 The two-
day meeting resulted in the issuance of the Windsor Declaration, which fo-
cused on "specific co-operative measures to strengthen regulatory supervi-
sion, minimize systemic risk, and enhance customer protection with a view
to preventing or containing the adverse effects of financial disruptions. 35
The Windsor Declaration adopted recommendations relating to four
major areas: cooperation between market authorities; protection of customer
positions, funds and assets; default procedures; and regulatory cooperation
in emergencies. It was agreed that information sharing and cooperation
among markets and their regulators concerning large exposures and other
regulatory concerns should be explored and promoted. In addition, the de-
velopment of mechanisms to protect customer positions, funds and assets
during a firm's insolvency would be pursued, as would methods of contain-
ing financial disruption related to a firm's default or collapse. Finally, it
34 See Commodity Markets: Regulators Meet on Futures Trade, WALL ST. J. EUR., May
18, 1995, at 17.
35Windsor Declaration, issued at Windsor, England on May 17, 1995, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/oia/windsordeclaration.htm. The signatories to the Windsor Declaration
are regulators from Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States. See id.
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was agreed to develop mechanisms to enhance cooperation and
communication among regulators during emergencies.
The Windsor Declaration committed each signatory to take action nec-
essary to promote the recommendations at a domestic level. It further pro-
vided that IOSCO would undertake the implementation of the
recommendations through its Technical Committee. At IOSCO's 1995 An-
nual Meeting that summer, IOSCO's President's Committee adopted a reso-
lution urging IOSCO members to "take all steps that are necessary and
appropriate in their home jurisdictions to endorse and promote the measures
agreed upon in the Windsor Declaration to all cross-border transactions"
and authorized IOSCO's Technical Committee to implement the recom-
mendations in the Windsor Declaration. 6 All 72 member countries of
IOSCO endorsed the Windsor Declaration at that meeting.37
A number of IOSCO initiatives resulted from the Windsor Declaration.
Through its Technical Committee, the CFTC spearheaded efforts that pro-
duced international consensus documents on cooperation between market
authorities, default procedures at exchanges and client asset protection.38
Each of these reports contributed significantly to the ability of the interna-
tional regulatory community to deal with a default like that of Barings.
C. The Boca Declaration
Perhaps the most notable international regulatory accomplishment in
the aftermath of the Barings collapse was the March 15, 1996 Declaration
on Cooperation and Supervision of International Futures Exchanges and
Clearing Organisations signed in Boca Raton, Florida
("Boca Declaration") and its companion document, a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding executed by derivatives exchanges and clearinghouses. 9 The
Boca Declaration was initially signed by derivatives regulators from four-
teen jurisdictions, while the Memorandum of Understanding among ex-
changes and clearing organizations involved 49 organizations from 18
36 IOSCO President's Committee, A Resolution Concerning Cross-Boarder Transactions
(July 1995), at http://www.iosco.org/resolutions/resolutions-documentl5.html.
37 See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, CFTC, Address at the 18"' Annual Commodities Law
Institute and the 4' Annual Financial Services Law Institute Conference (Oct. 19, 1995), at
http://www.cftc.gov/opalspeeches/kent2.html.
38 IOSCO Technical Committee, Client Asset Protection (Aug. 1996),
http://wwv.iosco.org/docs-public/1996-client-assetprotection.html; IOSCO Technical
Committee, Report on Cooperation Between Market Authorities and Default Procedures
(Mar. 1996), at http://wwwv.iosco.org/docs-public/1996-report-on cooperation.html; IOSCO
Technical Committee, Report on Margin (Mar. 1996), at http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html;
see Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Annual Report 62 (1996), at
http://wwv.cftc.gov/annualreport96/tmrev96.html.
39 Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of International Futures Markets and
Clearing Organisations, executed on March 15, 1996, in Boca Raton, Florida, available at
http://vww.cftc.gov/oia/ bocadec0398.htm.
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countries n4 The CFTC, along with the SIB, played an instrumental role in
developing the Boca Declaration and hosted the meeting of international
regulators at which it was signed.41
Both the Boca Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding
provide for bilateral information sharing between signatories. Under these
arrangements, information sharing is triggered by events relating to signifi-
cant financial reverses of a member of an exchange or clearing organiza-
tion. The Boca Declaration provides that a regulatory authority may request
information relevant to the triggering event and that information will be
provided to the extent that the authority receiving such request has access to
the requested information. The Memorandum of Understanding provides
that exchanges and clearinghouses are to share information bilaterally with
other exchanges and clearinghouses to the extent permitted by law and are
to allow their regulatory authorities to act as intermediaries or gateways to
pass information where the exchanges or clearinghouses themselves may
not do so. The information received pursuant to a request is to be used
solely for carrying out the supervisory responsibilities of the regulator, ex-
change or clearinghouse requesting the information, and its use is subject to
such conditions as the provider of the information may request in light of its
laws. The Boca Declaration also contains provisions relating to the confi-
dentiality of the information shared.
These arrangements were the first multilateral information-sharing
agreements relating to derivatives trading and were the first complementary
agreements among regulators on the one hand and derivatives exchanges
and clearing organizations on the other. The arrangements facilitate one
another, with regulators supporting the efforts of exchanges and clearing-
houses to share information with one another as needed to protect their
markets from disruption and stepping in where needed to implement such
information sharing. Furthermore, the Boca Declaration recognizes that
regulatory authorities themselves may need to seek information to perform
their regulatory functions and details the circumstances in which such a re-
quest may be made and the mechanism for making the request.
With the adoption of these arrangements, the need for swift warning
and information exchange concerning potential defaults was recognized,
and a mechanism for accomplishing these goals was put in place. Deriva-
tives regulators and markets were thus in an improved position to react ef-
40 The original signatories of the Boca Declaration, in addition to the CFTC and the SIB,
included regulatory authorities from Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa and Spain. See id. See also
Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, International Futures Regulators
Fron 14 Jurisdictions Sign Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision Covering Interna-
tional Futures Markets, Press Release 3995-96 (Mar. 5, 1996), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/ press96/declare.htm.
41 See id.
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fectively to crises in the international markets. Unfortunately, they did not
have long to wait.
IV. SUMITOMO CORPORATION'S MANIPULATION OF THE
COPPER MARKET
Within three months of the adoption of the Boca Declaration, Sumi-
tomo Corporation of Japan ("Sumitomo") announced on June 13, 1996, that
it had lost an estimated $1.8 billion- later raised to $2.6 billion- through
trading in copper futures and options on the London Metal Exchange
("LME"). 42 Sumitomo is a Japanese corporation that sells copper through-
out the world and in that connection engages in copper futures and option
transactions on the New York Mercantile Exchange ("Nymex") and LME to
hedge its price risks. Sumitomo maintained that its losses were caused by
unauthorized speculative trading in copper derivatives by the employee in
charge of its copper trading, Yasuo Hamanaka. Because of its vast re-
sources, Sumitomo was able to absorb its losses without default.
However, the Sumitomo incident went beyond large losses and the po-
tential of default in the derivatives markets and thus was not a mere repeat
of the Barings affair. As was demonstrated later through investigation by
the CFTC, Sumitomo had used the LME and OTC derivatives markets to
manipulate the price of copper in the U.S., thus costing consumers and
commercial interests billions of dollars.
A. Efforts to Contain the U.S. Impact
The CFTC staff had been concerned about prices in the global copper
market and particularly on Nymex and LME since early 1995.43 Their sur-
veillance information demonstrated that pricing in the market was abnor-
mal, and they suspected that the market was being manipulated. The price
of futures on both LME and Nymex became increasingly volatile during
1995, and significant backwardation in the pricing occurred, indicating a
price distortion.44 LME had opened copper warehouses in the United States
and established U.S. delivery points for its copper futures contracts during
42 See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Sumitomo Says It Found Loss Of $1.8 Billion, N.Y. TMES,
Jun. 14, 1996, at DI; Sandra Sugawara, Japanese Copper Trader Arrested, Accused of
Fraud, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A24.43 See generally, Testimony of Brooksley Born, Chairperson, CFTC, Before the House of
Representatives Committee on Banking and Financial Services, September 18, 1996, for a
description of the Sumitomo losses and the CFTC's responses to disruption in the copper
markets in 1995 and 1996, at http://www.cftc.gov/opalspeecheslbom-l.html.
44 The sustained backwardization of pricing on the LME and Nymex copper markets was
an indication of an artificial impact on price. Backwardization is a market condition in
which the price of the commodity for near-term delivery is at a premium to the price of the
commodity for deferred delivery. Sustained backwardization may indicate that a squeeze is
being placed on current stocks.
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1995, which increased the effect that activity on LME had on prices on
Nymex and in the U.S. cash market for physical copper. The CFTC staff
also detected unusual activity in warehouse stocks. The CFTC's enforce-
ment investigation later revealed that, by the Fall of 1995, Sumitomo owned
almost all of the LME warehouse stocks in copper and held a massive posi-
tion on LME, causing a sharp increase in cash copper prices and a signifi-
cant backwardation in futures prices in the U.S.45
The CFTC's investigation of positions on the Nymex copper market
did not reveal any cause of the abnormal activity and prices, and the CFTC
requested information from the U.K. SIB concerning transactions on LME.
The CFTC had available to it very effective market surveillance methods,
including large trader reports of positions in copper futures and options on
Nymex. However, the SIB did not have the regulatory tools necessary to
investigate market positions of Sumitomo or other customers on LME.
Moreover, competitive rivalry between LME and Nymex frustrated infor-
mation sharing between the two exchanges and initially may have influ-
enced the willingness of the SIB to share information with the CFTC.
Therefore, the CFTC was frustrated in its ability to investigate the causes of
the price abnormalities during 1995 because it was limited to information
about the U.S. markets. At a time when Sumitomo's manipulative scheme
might have been stopped before great harm was caused to copper market
participants, the CFTC's hands were tied by lack of information.
When Sumitomo informed the CFTC of its enormous losses and its
plan to announce them publicly in June 1996, the CFTC took immediate
steps to contain the financial impact of that announcement in the United
States. The CFTC asked that Sumitomo also announce that it would stand
behind its copper obligations, act responsibly in the marketplace and coop-
erate in the CFTC's investigation of its activities. Sumitomo's announce-
ment to that effect acted as a damper on price volatility in the market and
prevented the panic that might have occurred if market participants had be-
lieved that Sumitomo would default on its obligations.
The CFTC promptly notified the other members of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets - the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Department of the Treasury and the SEC -
about Sumitomo's pending announcement and details of the situation. The
members of the President's Working Group were thereafter kept informed
of the CFTC's surveillance of the copper markets and its investigation of
possible manipulation.
The CFTC also made an immediate assessment of the likely impact of
Sumitomo's announcement in the U.S. The CFTC established promptly
45 See In the Matter of Sumitomo Corp., COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 27,327 (1998),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ogc/oporders98/fsumitomo.html.
46 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 15.00, 15.01, 15.03, 17.00, 18.00 (2000).
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through the large trader reporting system that neither Sumitomo nor any re-
lated firm had large positions on any U.S. markets and that Sumitomo was
not acting as a broker for any U.S. customers. The CFTC also identified
U.S. entities with large positions in copper futures or options on Nymex and
was able to assess the impact of likely price volatility in the copper market
on U.S. clearing firms.
At this point, the CFTC for the first time invoked the Boca Declara-
tion, which it was authorized to do because of the triggering event of the
large Sumitomo losses. The CFTC requested information from the SIB
about the positions of Sumitomo and the affiliates of U.S. firms on the LME
copper market. The SIB now recognized the seriousness of the situation
and became more responsive to the CFTC's information requests. Nonethe-
less, there still remained some confusion and disagreement about what in-
formation was relevant for regulatory purposes and what information might
be competitively sensitive.
Based on information gathered in the U.S. by the CFTC and informa-
tion provided to it by the SIB, the CFTC examined the potential exposure of
U.S. firms that were carrying positions on LME for Sumitomo through their
U.K. affiliates in order to assess the potential for financial impact on the
U.S. firms. In consultation with the SIB, the CFTC confirmed that it was
unlikely that Sumitomo would default or become insolvent and that there-
fore, the primary financial risk was from potentially severe fluctuations in
the price of copper. Information was shared about the identity and positions
of U.S. based firms with the largest positions on LME and the exposure of
U.S. firms to fluctuations in copper prices. Information concerning the ex-
cess capital at U.K. affiliates of U.S. firms indicated that such firms would
likely be able to weather a period of severe price fluctuation. The CFTC's
ability to obtain this information from the SIB demonstrated the usefulness
of the Boca Declaration, although the CFTC and the SIB also became aware
of some weaknesses in implementing the Boca Declaration which needed to
be addressed.
Because Sumitomo had a very deep pocket, its loss of $2.6 billion did
not have severe and wide-spread financial repercussions. Unlike Barings,
Sumitomo was not rendered insolvent and did not need to be rescued by a
take-over. Moreover, price volatility on the copper markets did not cause
other major firms to default. Nonetheless, the impact of Sumitomo's activi-
ties on world copper prices did have a profound economic impact both
within the U.S. and abroad. As the CFTC investigation revealed, Sumitomo
manipulated the price of copper in what may well have been the most sig-
nificant commodity price manipulation since the Hunt brothers' manipula-
tion of the world market in silver in 1979 and 1980.
B. Enforcement Actions
In December 1995 the CFTC instituted an enforcement investigation
into whether the copper markets were being manipulated. The CFTC en-
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forcement staff conducted a broad-based investigation of Sumitomo's ac-
tivities in close cooperation with U.K. and Japanese authorities. As a result
of that investigation, on May 11, 1998, the CFTC issued an order finding
that Sumitomo had manipulated the copper market in 1995 and 1996
through its actions on LME, which caused artificially high prices in U.S.
cash and futures markets in copper.47 Because of Sumitomo's actions, cop-
per prices had risen to a high of about $2,800 per metric ton in late 1995
and early 1996 and then fell abruptly to below $2,000 after Sumitomo reas-
signed Mr. Hamanaka in May 1996. Sumitomo had also used OTC transac-
tions in furtherance of its manipulative scheme, both to obtain financing
and to disguise the speculative nature of its transactions.48
Sumitomo settled this matter with the CFTC by agreeing to an order in
which the CFTC ordered that Sumitomo cease and desist from further viola-
tion of the manipulation provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act.49 The
CFTC also ordered Sumitomo to pay a total of $150 million, of which $125
million was paid to the United States Treasury as a civil monetary penalty.
At that time, this was the largest civil monetary penalty that the United
States government had ever imposed. The additional $25 million was paid
into escrow to provide restitution to U.S. persons injured by Sumitomo's
unlawful conduct.
In addition, the CFTC found that Merrill Lynch International, Inc. and
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith (Brokers & Dealers), Ltd. had aided
and abetted Sumitomo by providing more than $500 million of credit which
Sumitomo used to purchase and hold a dominant position in LME futures
contracts and LME warehouse stocks of copper and through other activities.
The CFTC settled with those companies in June 1999, ordering them to pay
a civil monetary penalty of $15 million and to cease and desist from violat-
ing and aiding and abetting violations of the anti-manipulation provisions of
the commodities laws.50
The level of cooperation with U.K. and Japanese authorities in con-
ducting the enforcement investigations into this matter was unprecedented
and led to successful legal and disciplinary actions in all three countries.
The ease of international information sharing in the enforcement area con-
trasted sharply with the difficulties experienced in earlier market surveil-
lance efforts. This difference was probably due to the extensive experience
47 See In the Matter of Sumitomo Corp., supra note 45.4 8 
rd.
49 Id. Sumitomo was ordered to cease and desist from violating Commodity Exchange
Act §§ 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(c), 13b(d), 13(a)(2).
So See Order Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions As to Respondents
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (Brokers & Dealers), Ltd. and Merrill Lynch
International, Inc. and Dismissing the Proceeding as to Respondent Merrill Lynch & Co.,
CoMM. Fur. L. RiEi. (CCH) 27,686 (1999).
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of the CFTC and the SIB in enforcement cooperation and the novelty of
sharing pre-enforcement market surveillance data.
C. International Initiatives
In the aftermath of the Sumitomo problem, the SIB announced a pub-
lic review of LME and the adequacy of its regulatory powers and market
oversight. The CFTC commented during the review, urging that the U.K.
adopt large trader reporting so that its markets and regulatory authorities
could detect efforts at manipulation. If the U.K. had had large trader report-
ing similar to that available to the CFTC, the SIB and CFTC would have
been able to detect Sumitomo's manipulative scheme by sharing informa-
tion at a much earlier stage. The CFTC also pointed out that Sumitomo's
large losses were hidden for a long period because of extensions of credit
allowed by U.K. futures markets. The CFTC suggested that the SIB con-
sider requiring the collection of variation margin and daily mark to market
and settlement of trades, thus precluding large long-term unsecured credit
risks in the derivatives markets.
As noted above, the Sumitomo matter was the first occasion on which
the CFTC attempted to exercise its rights to request information pursuant to
the Boca Declaration. The experience of the CFTC and the SIB indicated
that undue delay in sharing market information could occur even between
well-intentioned regulators because of issues concerning the scope and
relevancy of information requested. The Sumitomo incident had confirmed
that information sharing may be important to market oversight and regula-
tion even before any enforcement actions are envisioned and that the infor-
mation needed may involve the state of the market as a whole as well as the
situation of particular market participants. The Boca Declaration did not
adequately address issues relating to the types of information which should
be shared in a market crisis. Furthermore, it focused on default of a firm
and did not address market manipulation and price distortion. The competi-
tion between LME and Nymex had prevented information-sharing between
them, confirming the need for information sharing between regulators as
authorized in the Boca Declaration.
In light of this experience, the CFTC and the SIB proposed to the
IOSCO Technical Committee in September 1996 that it develop a frame-
work describing the types of information needed by international regulators
during particular types of market events, thus allowing regulators to have an
advance understanding of what information would likely be requested and
should be provided. The Technical Committee agreed to do so and, with
the assistance of the CFTC and the SIB, subsequently issued its report enti-
tled Guidance on Information Sharing (November 1997), which focused on
the information to be shared in three circumstances: a financial crisis at a
firm, a major market-wide price move, and unusual price movements or
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market volatility in a particular contract.5 ' This report should facilitate
prompt sharing of relevant information during a market crisis.
D. The Tripartite Conferences
The CFTC, the SIB and derivatives regulators from Japan agreed to
convene a meeting of international regulators of commodity futures markets
to discuss the implications of the Sumitomo affair for derivatives market
regulation and international cooperation. 52 The Japanese authorities partici-
pating in this tripartite effort were the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry ("MITI"), which regulates Japanese futures markets in metals and
energy, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries ("MAFF"),
which regulates futures markets in agricultural products. The co-sponsors
believed that Sumitomo's manipulation of the copper markets demonstrated
that derivatives markets in international commodities involving physical de-
livery, such as copper, posed special regulatory issues and concerns, espe-
cially relating to the availability of deliverable supplies and susceptibility to
market manipulation. The co-sponsors also thought that it was appropriate
for the three countries most involved in the Sumitomo matter to take re-
sponsibility for bringing together other regulators of physical commodity
markets.
At the invitation of the co-sponsors, regulatory authorities responsible
for supervising commodity futures markets from 16 countries met on No-
vember 25 and 26, 1996, in London to discuss these issues.53 At the end of
the meeting they issued the London Communique on Supervision of Com-
modity Futures Markets.54 In the Communiqu6, the regulators recognized
that futures contracts based on an underlying physical commodity - and
particularly those requiring physical delivery - pose particular concerns for
market integrity and the supervision of such markets. The Communiqu6
notes that "no forum to date has addressed the particular concerns raised by
markets whose underlying product is a physical commodity. 55
The regulators decided to focus on contract specifications, market sur-
veillance and information sharing and cooperation relating to such markets.
Consensus was reached on a number of points, including the following:
51 IOSCO Technical Committee, Guidance on Information Sharing (Nov. 1997), at
http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/l 998-guidanceinformationsharing__ocument02.html.
52 See generally, Tokyo Commodity Futures Markets Regulators' Conference (Oct.
1997), available at http://www.cftc.gov/oia/Tokyorpt.pdf.
53 See id. The participants in the meeting included regulatory authorities from Australia,
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.
54 See id. at 31 (reproducing text of London Communiqu6 on Supervision of Commodity
Futures Markets).
5I Id. at 32.
The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
21:607 (2001)
" proper contract design is critical to reducing the susceptibility
of such contracts to market abuses, including manipulation,
and is an important complement to an appropriate market sur-
veillance program;
* an effective market surveillance program of such markets
should be designed to detect and prevent abusive conduct and
requires that market authorities have access to necessary in-
formation;
* market authorities of related markets should share surveillance
information in order to manage market disruption; and
" regulatory measures that facilitate the identification of large
exposures should be developed and may involve access to in-
formation relating to the persons controlling large exposures
and their related exchange, OTC and cash market positions as
well as access to information on deliveries.
The regulators decided to undertake further work on these issues. The
participants would survey current practices concerning the review of con-
tract terms, practices and procedures with respect to market surveillance
and the type of surveillance information that may be obtained, and existing
regulatory powers to adopt measures designed to prevent or inhibit abusive
conduct. It was also decided to develop standards of best practices for the
design and review of commodity contracts and for market surveillance to
detect and prevent abusive conduct, including procedures to identify large
exposures. Further, it was decided to examine existing information sharing
arrangements including the Boca Declaration to assess their adequacy.
Support for IOSCO's ongoing effort to categorize and prioritize the infor-
mation to be shared during particular market events was also agreed upon.
Working parties were established to conduct these efforts, and it was agreed
to complete the work within twelve months and to meet again in Japan at
that time.
The working parties conducted surveys of the conference participants
on contract design standards, market surveillance practices and information
sharing arrangements in early 1997, and the results of the surveys were pub-
lished in June 1997 at the London International Derivatives Week Confer-
ence.56  At the same time, a subcommittee of IOSCO's Consultative
Committee, consisting of representatives of futures exchanges and other de-
rivatives self-regulatory organizations, published a report with its views on
these subjects.5 The Consultative Committee had been asked to assist the
56 COLLATION OF RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM REGULATORY AUTHORTIES TO THE SURVEYS
ON CONTRACT DESIGN, MARKET SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMATION SHARING (June 1997).
57 RESPONSE TO THE SURVEY OF OPINION REGARDING 'EST PRACTICES" FOR TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF COMMODITY CONTRACTS AND SURVEILLANCE OF COMMODITY MARKETS AND
OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) COMMODITY FUTURES ACTIVITIES ("MARKET SURVELLANCE"),
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working parties by gathering the views of futures exchanges and their
members.
On October 30 and 31, 1997, the regulators met again in Tokyo, Japan
and issued the Tokyo Communiqu6 on Supervision of Commodity Futures
Markets.58 The participants adopted and published standards of best prac-
tice for the markets - Guidance on Standards of Best Practice for the De-
sign and/or Review of Commodity Contracts ("Contract Design Guidance")
and Guidance on Components of Market Surveillance and Information
Sharing ("Market Surveillance Guidance").5 9
The Contract Design Guidance adopts the following standards:
" a competent market authority should establish a clear frame-
work for contract design and review criteria and procedures
and should have the power to amend the provisions of existing
contracts which are susceptible to manipulative or disorderly
market conditions;
" contracts should meet risk management and/or price discovery
needs;
* contract terms should reflect the operation of the underlying
cash market and should avoid impediments to delivery;
* settlement and delivery procedures should reflect the underly-
ing cash market and promote price convergence between the
futures market and the cash market;
* the views of potential market users should be taken into ac-
count in designing contracts;
* information concerning contract terms and conditions and in-
formation concerning delivery and pricing should be readily
available to market authorities and market users; and
" contract design standards should complement, but not be a
substitute for, appropriate market surveillance.
The Market Surveillance Guidance includes the following standards:
* each market authority should have a clear framework for con-
ducting market surveillance, compliance and enforcement ac-
tivities, and there should be oversight of those activities;
* information should be collected on a routine and non-routine
basis for on-exchange, OTC and cash markets, including in-
formation that permits market authorities to identify market
Subcommittee on the London Communique of the Consultative Committee of IOSCO, Lon-
don Communique Project (May 30, 1997).58 Tokyo Commodity Futures Markets Regulators' Conference, supra note 52.
9Id. at 13-30.
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users' positions, concentrations of positions and the composi-
tion of the market;
" collection and analysis of such information should occur
speedily;
" effective emergency powers should be available to intervene in
the market to prevent or address abusive practices or disorderly
conditions;
" effective power should be available to discipline market mem-
bers;
" a relevant authority should also have power to address abusive
actions of non-members of the market; and
* market authorities should cooperate to share information on
large exposures.
These Guidances are the first multilateral international documents in-
corporating best practice standards for regulation of the derivatives markets
and thus were an extremely significant step in demonstrating the existence
of a consensus among the world's regulators of such markets. They also
represented a significant step toward enhancing and harmonizing regulation
of these markets. The Guidances establish worldwide regulatory bench-
marks which can help each regulator to assess how its standards and prac-
tices compare with best practices and to adopt regulatory improvements.
Each of the participants in the tripartite effort agreed to examine its
own practices to ensure that the best practices in the Guidances would be
put into effect within its jurisdiction. They also specifically agreed that
they would seek "the removal of domestic legal or other barriers to ensure,
consistent with the regulatory framework of each jurisdiction, access by
market authorities to information that permits them to detect and to deter
abusive practices and disorderly conditions in the markets, including access
to information that permits them to identify concentrations of positions and
the overall composition of the market."
60
During the course of the year-long work program, the participants in
the tripartite effort realized that certain regulators of commodity derivatives
markets were precluded by the terms of the Boca Declaration from becom-
ing signatories because they did not regulate financial futures and/or were
not members of IOSCO. For example, the Japanese ministries involved in
the tripartite effort were not eligible to become signatories. The participants
agreed that the Boca Declaration should be amended to allow such authori-
ties to become signatories. It was also agreed that participants would raise
with IOSCO whether such authorities could become associate members of
IOSCO and thus participate in its activities.
60Id. at9.
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The participants agreed to establish and maintain an emergency contact
list for information sharing of surveillance and delivery information during
significant market events or problems with firms. The participants en-
dorsed the IOSCO effort to categorize and prioritize information to be
shared during specific market events, which resulted in the IOSCO publica-
tion entitled Guidance on Information Sharing (November 1997).6 It was
also agreed that the survey information reported in IOSCO's publication,
International Regulation of Derivative Markets, Products and Financial In-
termediaries,62 should be kept current and up to date.
The participants agreed that future efforts were needed. First, they
agreed to consider amendment of the Boca Declaration to extend its appli-
cation to information sharing concerning manipulative activities and un-
usual price movements. Second they decided to refer to IOSCO a number
of matters, including the extent to which the two Guidances could be ap-
plied to financial and other derivatives markets as well as to physical com-
modity markets, the need for further guidance on the components of market
surveillance, and further delineation of manipulative activities and abusive
practices in commodity futures markets.
The actions adopted in the Tokyo Communiqu6 set out clear standards
for ongoing international regulatory cooperation and for appropriate over-
sight of contract development and market activity in commodity futures
markets. The Guidances provide for the first time useful international
benchmarks for the supervision of commodity derivatives markets and un-
derscore the importance of detecting and deterring manipulative activities
such as those engaged in by Sumitomo. The consensus on the need for in-
formation concerning large positions on exchange markets and related cash
and OTC markets was a significant step forward in enhancing the interna-
tional standards of regulation of these markets, particularly in light of the
participants' commitment to work to alter their domestic laws in order to
implement the provision. Furthermore, the recognition of the importance of
sharing such information as part of an international effort to detect broad-
based manipulation efforts in their incipiency represents substantial pro-
gress toward protecting the integrity of the global marketplace.
These measures addressed many of the problems demonstrated by the
Sumitomo crisis: the importance of deterring manipulative schemes by
careful contract design, the importance of gathering trader position and
market concentration information in detecting such schemes, and the impor-
tance of sharing such information with other affected countries so that the
scope and nature of the schemes can be identified.
61 IOSCO Technical Committee, Guidance on Information Sharing (November 1997),
available at http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998guidance-information-sharing_ docu-
ment02.html.
62 See http://www.isoco.org/docs-public/download 1996-regulation-of derivativemar
kets.html.
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E. Amendments to the Boca Declaration
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Tokyo Communiqu6, the Boca
Declaration was amended so as to permit commodity derivatives regulators
to become signatories, and both MITI and MAFF signed the Boca Declara-
tion in October 1997.63 Six additional signatories to the Boca Declaration
had signed on earlier in the year,64 and three additional regulatory authori-
ties joined in late 1997 subsequent to the removal of the restrictive mem-
bership requirements.6 ' This amendment ensured that the Boca Declaration
would be available to the regulators most likely to need information on ma-
nipulative schemes.
Furthermore, the Boca Declaration was amended in March 1998 spe-
cifically to address and authorize information sharing relating to potential
manipulative or abusive practices triggered by price distortions or other in-
dications of such activities.66 For example, such information sharing may
be triggered by large price movements, unusual price relationships or the at-
tempt by a market participant to accumulate an unusually large position. 67
These amendments to the Boca Declaration had the effect of enhancing in-
temational information sharing as it relates to commodity derivatives mar-
kets and made more effective the international efforts to detect and deter
manipulation of such markets.
F. IOSCO Implementation of Recommendations of the Tripartite
Conferences
At the request of the CFTC and the SIB, the IOSCO Technical Com-
mittee agreed to explore the applicability of the two Guidances adopted dur-
ing the Tokyo conference of October 1997 to derivatives markets in
financial instruments. At the IOSCO Annual Meeting in November 1997,
6 3 See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commodity Derivatives
Regulators Publish Guidance on Strengthening the Supervisors of International Markets,
Press Release 4072-97 (Oct. 31, 1997), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press97/
opa4072-97.htm.
64 Regulatory authorities from Brazil, Denmark, Hungary, Malaysia, Portugal and Swe-
den had signed in early 1997. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Six Additional Countries Sign Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision Covering Inter-
national Futures Markets, Press Release 4003-97 (Mar. 12, 1997), available at
http://vww.cftc.gov/opa/ press97/opa4003-97.html.65 Regulatory authorities from Argentina, Turkey and New Zealand became signatories in
late 1997. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, International Fu-
tures Regulators Amend Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of International Fu-
tures Markets and Clearing Organizations to Address Potential Manipulative or Abusive
Practices, Press Release 4125-98 (Mar. 20, 1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa
/press98/opa4l25-98.htm.
66 See id.
67 Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of International Futures Markets and
Clearing Organisations, as amended, available at http://Nvwv.cftc.gov/oia/bocadec0398.htm.
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IOSCO announced that it had agreed "to further consider the extent to
which the guidances developed for physical delivery commodity markets or
markets with deliverables of finite supply could be extended to financial or
other derivatives markets including OTC markets" and "to further develop
the surveillance components addressed by the guidances by expanding upon
the techniques of markets surveillance. 6
In December 1999, the Technical Committee completed its work on
this subject with assistance from the CFTC and issued a report entitled Ap-
plication of the Tokyo Communiqud to Exchange-Traded Financial Deriva-
tives Contracts.69 The report concludes that the basic precepts of the
Market Surveillance Guidance apply to derivatives on all types of com-
modities, but that differences in the underlying commodity and the size and
composition of the market may require market authorities to place different
emphasis on particular surveillance issues. Therefore, the report states that
market authorities should adapt the recommendations in the Market Surveil-
lance Guidance in certain respects in order effectively to monitor their par-
ticular derivatives markets. The report lists the types of commodities on
which derivatives are currently traded and the types of abusive or manipu-
lative practices to which such trading is subject. It concludes that surveil-
lance depends in part on whether the derivative contract calls for delivery of
a physical commodity, delivery of a financial instrument or cash settlement
and suggests that contracts calling for delivery are most susceptible to ma-
nipulation when the deliverable supply of products is small relative to the
positions held by traders. Pertinent surveillance issues for each type of in-
strument are outlined.
With respect to the Contract Design Guidance, the Technical Commit-
tee's report concludes that many issues in the design of commodity futures
contracts are generic to all derivatives contracts so that the basic tenets of
the Contract Design Guidance are equally useful to all types of exchange-
traded derivatives contracts. However, here too the Technical Committee
recommends that market authorities may need to place different emphasis
on particular issues depending on the nature of the underlying commodity
and the nature of the cash market. The report confirms that contract design
standards are intended to ensure that contracts are not readily susceptible to
manipulation, that the delivery and/or settlement mechanism is reliable and
that the prices of the underlying commodity and the derivatives contract
converge at the expiration of the derivatives contract so that the contract can
perform a hedging function. It also states that contract design standards are
a necessary complement to market surveillance.
68 See IOSCO Technical Committee Report, Application of the Tokyo Communiqug to
Exchange-Traded Financial Derivatives Contracts, (Dec. 1999) at 1-2, available at
http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998-exchange-tradedderivativesdocument02.html.
69 Id"
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In addition, the report focuses on international information sharing
mechanisms to maintain market integrity, detect, deter and sanction poten-
tially abusive or manipulative conduct and reduce systemic risk. It suggests
that many of the elements in the Technical Committee's report on Guidance
on Information Sharing (November 1997)70 are applicable to international
surveillance of suspected manipulation and market abuse. The report also
states, "The information sharing portion of the [Market] Surveillance Guid-
ance recommends that market authorities should be able to access sufficient
information about on-exchange and related cash and OTC positions to iden-
tify dangerous concentrations of positions, to evaluate the overall composi-
tion of the market and to assess its functioning. This information is
important irrespective of the nature of the underlying reference price.
Knowing the whole position of a market participant in related exchange,
cash and OTC markets generally is necessary to assess appropriately the
risk of the participant's position and the nature of that participant's trading
strategies." The report concludes that all of the information sharing stan-
dards in the Market Surveillance Guidance are applicable to financial de-
rivatives contracts. In this manner, IOSCO's Technical Committee
endorsed the two Guidances and broadened their applicability to include all
derivatives instruments, thus extending a number of best practice standards
to derivatives generally.
At the CFTC's initiative, IOSCO interpreted its membership criteria in
November 1997 so as to allow commodity futures regulators to become as-
sociate members. As a result, MITI and MAFF both became members of
IOSCO in November 1997. This action ensures that the regulators of im-
portant commodity markets can participate fully in the ongoing develop-
ment of global regulatory standards through the auspices of IOSCO.
V. THE COLLAPSE OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.
Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. ("LTCM"), a company located
in Greenwich, Connecticut, was the operator of several very large hedge
funds, speculative investment vehicles for large institutions and very
wealthy investors.72 Its largest fund was very profitable and well capital-
70 IOSCO Technical Committee, supra note 61.
71 See IOSCO Technical Committee Report, supra note 68.
72 For detailed descriptions of the LTCM episode, see HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT-REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/re-
leases! docs/hedgefund.pdf.; GAO, Long-Term Capital Management-Regulators Need to Fo-
cus Greater Attention on Systemic Risk (Oct. 1999); Testimony of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission before the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry (Dec. 16, 1998); Daniel R. Fischell and Randal C. Picker, Manager's Journal:
A Firm That Failed Well, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1998, at A18; Michael Siconolfi, Anita
Raghavan and Matt Murray, Hedge Fund's Bailout Money Is Going Fast, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 1998, at Cl.
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ized through 1997. At year-end 1997, this fund had more than $4.6 billion
in capital and net annual income of about $1.4 billion. However, by Sep-
tember 1998, because of enormous market losses, LTCM's fund's capital
had dipped well below $1 billion, and the fund was in serious financial dif-
ficulty. Prior to its financial difficulties and based on the reputation of its
principals, which included Nobel Prize winners, and its history of profitable
trading, LTCM had been able to leverage the fund's capital to invest in se-
curities valued at about $125 billion and had entered into derivatives con-
tracts with a notional amount of about $1.25 trillion. Most of these
derivatives were OTC transactions while the rest consisted of exchange-
traded futures on domestic and foreign exchanges.
Because of the scope of LTCM's investments, the prospect of a default
on its obligations threatened global economic stability. As stated by Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, "It was the judgment of officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, who were monitoring the situation on an ongoing basis, that the
act of unwinding LTCM's portfolio in a forced liquidation would not only
have a significant distorting impact on market prices but also in the process
could produce large losses, or worse, for a number of creditors and counter-
parties, and for other market participants who were not directly involved
with LTCM.
73
Because of concern that LTCM was about to default on margin calls on
its derivatives positions and other loans, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York facilitated a meeting of LTCM's major creditors and OTC derivatives
counterparties - some of the largest U.S. and European commercial banks
and investment banks. As a result, the group contributed more than $3.6
billion in capital to LTCM's largest fund in return for a 90% ownership in
it. This infusion of capital prevented LTCM's collapse and averted a sig-
nificant threat to the global economy. Again, for the third time in a four-
year period, a large institution's enormous losses in derivatives transactions
had endangered the world economy.
A. Efforts to Contain the U.S. Impact
As noted above, the Federal Reserve System was primarily responsible
for containing the LTCM crisis, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury
and the SEC were also significantly involved in doing so. The CFTC's
domestic efforts complemented and supplemented the actions of these other
federal financial regulators.
73 Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry, 10 50' Cong. 5 (1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Gov-
emors of the Federal Reserve System).
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On Wednesday, September 23, 1998, the Department of Treasury in-
formed the CFTC that LTCM was in serious financial difficulties.74
Through the CFTC's large trader reporting system," the CFTC staff
quickly determined the nature and value of the positions LTCM's hedge
funds held on U.S. futures exchanges and took steps to identify and address
any dangers to the exchanges and their clearinghouses resulting from
LTCM's problems. The staff determined that LTCM had promptly and
fully paid all margin obligations on its funds' futures positions on U.S. ex-
changes and that LTCM's funds' positions on those exchanges were cleared
by two well-capitalized FCMs, Bear Steams and Merrill Lynch, which were
responsible for margin payments to the exchange clearinghouses on the
LTCM funds' accounts.
The CFTC immediately contacted senior officials of the U.S. futures
exchanges on which LTCM's funds held large positions to warn them of a
potential default. The CFTC also alerted certain foreign regulatory authori-
ties to large positions of LTCM's funds on their derivatives markets. Be-
cause these foreign regulatory authorities did not have access to large
position information about their own derivatives markets, it was vitally im-
portant for the CFTC to provide them with information about these large
positions and to wam them of the potential of a default.
Later that day, the bail out of LTCM occurred, and the danger of a de-
fault on its obligations in the U.S. and abroad was averted. Because LTCM
acted as the operator of several hedge funds that were trading futures and
option contracts on futures exchanges, it was required to register as a com-
modity pool operator ("CPO") with the CFTC and the NFA.76 While the
CFTC had no prudential supervisory role with respect to LTCM, it did have
a responsibility to try to contain the danger to U.S. futures markets from
LTCM's financial difficulties. For that reason, the CFTC promptly sent au-
dit staff to LTCM to conduct a review and also to Bear Steams and Merrill
Lynch to inspect LTCM's accounts. The staff also contacted the NFA and
coordinated with the NFA in reviewing LTCM's financial condition. After
the LTCM bail-out, the staff continued to monitor the situation closely and
to verify that LTCM and its clearing FCMs were meeting their margin re-
quirements on U.S. futures exchanges.
While the CFTC had information about the positions of LTCM and
other large hedge funds in exchange-traded futures and options, it had no
information concerning OTC derivatives positions, for which there are no
reporting requirements. Because many institutions were being placed at
74 The actions of the CFTC in response to the LTCM crisis are described inTestimony of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the United States Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, supra note 72.71 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 15.00, 15.03, 17.00, 18.00 (2000).
76 See Commodity Exchange Act, §§ 4m, 4n, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6m, 6n; 17 C.F.R. Part 4
(2000).
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risk by the market volatility in the fall of 1998, the CFTC staff took steps to
try to identify other traders whose position in the OTC derivatives market
might affect U.S. regulated markets or financial stability. The staff con-
tacted the CPOs of certain hedge funds that reportedly had suffered large
losses and collected and analyzed detailed financial information from a
number of other CPOs of large funds. The CFTC also requested informa-
tion from certain FCMs concerning customers or counterparties with large
positions in the OTC derivatives market which might pose significant risks
and alerted FCMs, U.S. futures exchanges and the NFA to ensure that they
paid particular attention to those issues. The CFTC also conducted an in-
vestigation to ascertain whether any federal commodities laws had been
violated and examined the commodities laws and the CFTC's regulations to
determine whether they were sufficient and whether the CFTC should
amend its regulations to require heightened reporting from CPOs.
In analyzing the LTCM crisis, the CFTC identified a number of impor-
tant regulatory concerns relating to hedge funds and to the OTC derivatives
market: lack of transparency, excessive leverage, insufficient prudential
controls, and a need for greater international cooperation and coordina-
tion.7 The LTCM crisis demonstrated that these concerns had not been
adequately addressed in the domestic and international responses to the
Barings and Sumitomo crises.
1. Lack of Transparency
Although detailed information on large exchange-traded futures and
option positions is reported to the CFTC daily, no reporting requirements
are imposed on most OTC derivatives market participants. This lack of ba-
sic information about the positions held by OTC derivatives market partici-
pants, the nature of their investment strategies and the extent of their risk
exposures potentially allows them to take positions that may threaten the
regulated markets without the knowledge of any federal regulatory author-
ity. As the Guidance on Market Surveillance recognized, derivatives regu-
lators need information about traders' positions on the OTC and cash
markets as well as on exchange markets.
2. Excessive Leverage
While traders on futures exchanges must post margin and have their
positions marked to market on at least a daily basis, no such requirements
exist in the OTC derivatives market, permitting entities like LTCM to be-
come highly leveraged. Unlimited borrowing in the OTC derivatives market
poses potentially serious dangers to the economy.
77 See Testimony of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the United
States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, supra note 72.
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3. Insufficient Prudential Controls
Closely related to the issue of excessive lending to LTCM is the appar-
ent insufficiency of the internal controls applied by LTCM and its lenders
and counterparties. The prudential controls of LTCM's OTC derivatives
counterparties and creditors, the parties that seemingly had the greatest self-
interest in assessing LTCM's financial wherewithal, apparently failed.
They reportedly were unaware of LTCM's extensive borrowings and risk
exposures.
4. Cooperation Among International Regulators
The CFTC determined that the LTCM situation demonstrated the need
to continue its work with foreign derivatives regulators to ensure effective
worldwide oversight of hedge funds and other large users of OTC deriva-
tives.
B. Report of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets
In light of the LTCM incident, the President's Working Group on Fi-
nancial Markets, consisting of the Department of the Treasury, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the SEC and the CFTC, under-
took a study on hedge funds and the dangers they pose to the financial mar-
kets. The President's Working Group issued its report entitled Hedge
Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management in
April 1999.78 The report identifies as a central issue excessive leverage in
the market and lack of information about it. The report provides important
recommendations about each of the four main issues raised by the near col-
lapse of LTCM and identified by the CFTC: the need for increased trans-
parency; the need to eliminate excessive leverage; the need for better
prudential controls; and the need for enhanced international cooperation and
harmonization of regulation.
The report recognizes the critical importance of heightened transpar-
ency in the markets by recommending greater disclosure and reporting by
hedge funds. It calls for all hedge funds to report detailed financial infor-
mation, including information about their exposure to market risk, on a
quarterly basis. This information would be provided not only to regulators
but also to the public. It would thus be available to hedge fund investors,
counterparties and creditors to assess the creditworthiness of the hedge
fund. It would also be available to regulators and market participants to
help assess market integrity and financial stability. In addition, the report
recommends that all public companies should be required publicly to report
their exposure to highly leveraged financial institutions.
78 HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT-
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS (Apr. 1999), supra
note 72.
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The report also emphasizes the need for enhanced risk management ef-
forts by regulated entities and enhanced oversight of those efforts by regula-
tors. It endorses the view that prudential supervisors and regulators should
promote the development of more risk-sensitive approaches to capital ade-
quacy. It also encourages private groups, such as the Counterparty Risk
Management Policy Group and large hedge funds, to adopt standards for
enhanced risk management. 79 In addition, the report recommends that regu-
lators should have expanded risk assessment powers relating to unregulated
affiliates of securities broker-dealers and FCMs. It reaffirms support for the
President's Working Group's legislative proposal on financial contract net-
ting upon insolvency. Finally, the report recognizes the need for interna-
tional cooperation among regulators to encourage the adoption and
implementation of international standards governing hedge funds and credit
exposure to them in light of the large number of hedge funds operating
abroad and their international market participation. The President's Work-
ing Group also agreed that, if these measures should prove to be inadequate,
serious consideration should be given to the direct regulation of hedge
funds and other highly leveraged institutions, including such measures as
capital requirements. 80
C. IOSCO Actions
At the request of the CFTC, the IOSCO Technical Committee estab-
lished a task force in December 1998 to determine what measures might be
advisable to reduce the systemic risk and market stability concerns raised
by the activities of highly leveraged institutions such as LTCM. The Tech-
nical Committee released its report entitled Hedge Funds and Other Highly
Leveraged Institutions on November 5, 1999.8 The report finds that the
dangers of systemic risk posed by highly leveraged institutions require great
vigilance on the part of securities and derivatives firms which act as their
counterparties. Prudential controls and risk management tools are ex-
79 In response, a number of private groups have issued reports relating to the LTCM mat-
ter and the steps private firms should take more effectively to contain risk. See, e.g., Sound
Practices for Hedge Fund Managers (Feb. 2000) (prepared by a group of large hedge fund
managers); available at http://www.hfmsoundpractices.com/hfmsp.html; Counterparty Risk
Management Policy Group, Improving Counterparty Risk Management Practices (Main re-
port) (June 1999), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org; Managed Funds Associa-
tion, Hedge Funds: Issues for Public Policy Makers (Apr. 1999), available at
http://www.mfainfo.org/washington/hedgefunds/hedgefunds.html.
80 The General Accounting Office conducted an investigation of LTCM and concluded
that U.S. federal financial regulators and supervisors relied too heavily on the risk manage-
ment efforts of LTCM's regulated counterparties and "did not sufficiently consider systemic
threats that can arise from unregulated entities, such as LTCM." GAO, Long-Term Capital
Management - Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on Systemic Risk 3 (Oct. 1999).
"' IOSCO Technical Committee, Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged Institutions
(Nov. 1999), available at http://www.iosco.org/press/presscomn991105.htn-d.
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tremely important for such firms, and regulatory incentives to promote im-
provement in risk management by securities and derivatives firms are nec-
essary.
The report also contains recommendations regarding the need for addi-
tional transparency regarding the activities of highly leveraged institutions,
noting that insufficient information is generated by the information flow
from such institutions to their regulated counterparties. The report recom-
mends that additional transparency be achieved through disclosure to the
public of the activities of highly leveraged institutions, although it recog-
nizes that reports to regulators and/or market authorities might also be help-
ful. The report recognizes that it is likely to be necessary to require highly
leveraged institutions to provide information directly and recommends that,
at a minimum, voluntary provision of such information should be encour-
aged. 2
Ideally, to address the dangers exposed by the LTCM incident, harmo-
nized international standards relating to position reporting by hedge funds
and other highly leveraged institutions should be adopted by major market
jurisdictions around the globe. Such international action would be the best
answer to the frequently heard argument that any domestic regulation of
such institutions will drive them off shore. Global cooperation is essential
to avoid a race to the bottom in which individual regulatory authorities are
afraid to adopt modest protective measures for fear of placing their domes-
tic markets at a competitive disadvantage. The adoption of widely accepted
best practice standards relating to such entities would be a significant step
toward protecting the world's economy from repetitions of the LTCM inci-
dent.
The LTCM incident did not cause a global financial melt-down be-
cause LTCM went to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York about its fi-
nancial problems, the Federal Reserve Bank acted promptly and decisively,
and LTCM's creditors and counterparties were willing swiftly to take on the
responsibility of LTCM's losses. Next time we may not be as fortunate. It
is vitally important, therefore, to institutionalize international protections
against another similar episode.
82 A large number of other international organizations have considered the concerns
raised by the LTCM matter, including the G7, the G22, the Bank for International Settle-
ments, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Forum, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. See, e.g., Press Release, Financial Stabil-
ity Forum, Financial Stability Forum endorses policy actions aimed at reducing global fi-
nancial vulnerabilities, Report of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions
(HLIs) (Mar. 26, 2000), available at http://www.fsforum.org/Reports/RepHLI.html; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics, Occasional Paper 166
(May 1998), available at http://-v.imf.org/extemal/pubs/catlongres.cfn?sk&sk=2597.0;
Report of the G-22 Working Group on Transparency and Accountability (Oct. 1998); Decla-
ration of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, U.S. Department of Treasury,
RR-2792 (Oct. 30, 1998), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releaseslpr2792.htm.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The CFTC's efforts and those of other international derivatives regula-
tors have led to an increased level of international communication and co-
operation, growing consensus on the standards for regulation of derivatives
markets and a trend toward international regulatory convergence. These ac-
tions have created a framework that will enable international regulators to
deal more effectively with future crises in these markets. However, more
work needs to be done. Implementation of the reforms necessitated by the
Barings, Sumitomo and LTCM crises is still underway, and future crises
will undoubtedly lead to additional regulatory improvements.
Moreover, the multinational participants in the derivatives markets re-
quire and deserve a higher degree of international regulatory harmonization
to facilitate their business operations and to reduce the burdens of conform-
ing to many different national regulatory schemes. International regulators
have a responsibility not only to streamline and modernize domestic regula-
tory programs but also actively to pursue the elimination of unnecessary
regulatory divergence on an international level. With the continuing global-
ization of the financial markets, this must be the goal for the future.
